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INTRODUCTION
[1] This work is a critical review of the literature on patentable subject
matter. It examines the central feature of modern patent law—the
“invention”—at an international and comparative level. As with most
codified terms intended to have wide-ranging, prospective applicability, it
is usually left undefined, or if defined, is usually drafted broadly and
permissively. Despite the hallmarks of patentability (namely, novelty,
inventiveness, and industrial applicability), some courts1 and academic
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See Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 112 R.P.C. 25 (1995) (U.K.); Genentech Inc.’s Patent,
106 R.P.C. 147 (1989) (U.K.). But see Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 114 R.P.C. 1 (1997)
(U.K.).
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commentators2 have questioned whether there still needs to be an
invention in the first place, before one even considers its patentability.
[2] The following sections have been structured as follows. Parts I and II
provide an overview and early history of patentable subject matter. Part
III examines various subject matter which seem immune to patentability –
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Part IV addresses
the tools of basic research. Within this section, there appears to be a longstanding reluctance against the monopolization of these types of subject
matter. I have folded some of my discussions regarding biotechnological
innovations into this subsection, since some advances in biotechnology
can reasonably be viewed as involving or uncovering the tools of basic
research.
[3] Part V illustrates the internationalization of “invention” and patenteligible subject matter through the standard-setting agenda of TRIPS.3
Indeed, the literature in this field is generally divided between authors who
look at the concept of invention from an international perspective under
TRIPS, rather than an Americentric point of view. TRIPS has become the
focal point for many Commonwealth4 scholars since it is administered by
the WTO and sets out minimum standards for most forms of intellectual
property, and ratification of it is therefore a mandatory requirement for
membership in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) “game” (at least
as of 1994, following the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade).5
[4] The remaining sections, Parts VI, VII, and VIII, deal with patenting
intangible inventions (business methods, software, signals, and even
sporting techniques), and the role (if any) that policy and ethics ought to
2

See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (arguing that TRIPS has articulated a
subject matter threshold followed by the aforementioned hallmarks of patentability).
3
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
4
The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental, multilateral organization of countries with
historical constitutional links to Britain. See Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada, Canada and the Commonwealth, http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/commonwealth/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
5
TRIPS, supra note 3.
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play in determining subject matter eligibility. The problems that
biotechnological advances present to the concept of “invention” resurface
in the section on ethics and subject matter eligibility, especially in relation
to human-animal chimeras, and life forms that are genetically approximate
to humans.
I. OVERVIEW & ASSUMPTIONS ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
[5] Professor Vaver provides an overview of how the notion of invention
is presently interpreted under Commonwealth patent laws, by using TRIPS
as his starting point.6 Article 27.1 of TRIPS provides that “patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application,”7 with little more as to what qualifies
as an invention. Indeed, the only exceptions to patentability under TRIPS
are those necessary to protect any of the following: ordre public or
morality; diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals; plants and animals other than microorganisms, and in
essence biological processes for the production of plants or animals other
than non-biological and microbiological processes.8 These exceptions,
however, are neither absolute nor required; TRIPS states that Member
States “may” exclude these from patentability, but they are not required to
do so.9
[6] Vaver rightly notes that WTO trade panels have become a major
vehicle used to control the meaning of “invention” at an international
level. Signatories to TRIPS, although permitted to expand their “range of
items for which patents are granted,” may not “through legislation or
judicial decision, restrict the meaning of invention . . . . [As] the WTO
may, through its dispute resolution procedures, require the offender to
discard any unacceptably narrow meaning of invention or any
unacceptably broad interpretation of a permissible exception.”10
6

David Vaver, Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal, 11 INT’L J.L.
& INFO. TECH. 286, 289-90 (2003).
7
TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.1.
8
Vaver, supra note 6, at 290.
9
Id. at 301.
10
Id.
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Furthermore, Vaver remarks that there seems to be a trend towards the
reduction of the exceptions to patentability.11 Aside from common law
trends, Vaver notes that many bilateral treaties (concluded either in
response to, or to augment, existing obligations under TRIPS – so-called
“TRIPS-plus” treaties) have the effect of further relaxing restrictions to
patentability to the benefit of one of the parties to that treaty. This
relaxation of restrictions may in turn “have multilateral effects because
TRIPs requires any advantage extended by one WTO member to another
to be extended to all.”12
[7] Although I agree with Vaver’s views on the use of TRIPS to globalize
and control the meaning of “invention,” he does proffer some
controversial (and certainly, far from modest)13 claims and suggestions for
reform. Vaver writes that:
Patents should work manifestly in the public benefit – the
ultimate justification for the system. The public pays a high
price for patents. . . . Therefore the legislation should be
amended to exclude inventions that it would not be in the
public interest to patent – in effect, a return to the principle
of excluding “generally inconvenient” patents, but one
where the issue of “convenience” or “public interest” is
seriously weighed and considered.14
Vaver even argues that special ethics and public interest panels be
established, independent of the patent offices around the world, to decide
whether a particular invention qualifies as patentable subject matter.15
Perhaps this is where Vaver’s suggestions may have gone too far. In
11

Id.
TRIPS represents a relaxation of the patentability restrictions, however, “TRIPS-plus”
treaties narrow requirements even further. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 4; Vaver, supra
note 6, at 302 (emphasis omitted).
13
Although, it is likely that Vaver was making a guised reference to Jonathan Swift’s
book. See generally JOHN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL: FOR PREVENTING THE
CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE IN IRELAND FROM BEING A BURDEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR
THE COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLIC (1729) (suggesting
that poor Irish children be sold to the gentry as food).
14
Vaver, supra note 6, at 305.
15
Id. at 306-07.
12

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 1

particular, his suggestion that patents should work to the public’s benefit
appears inconsistent with the nature of a patent as a negative right. His
suggestion to establish an “Ethics and Public Interest Panel,”16 which
would be independent from the patent offices, neither defines patentable
subject matter nor helps one to find relevant examples of inventions that
qualify. Independent panels are often anything but independent. The
“public interest” (assuming that patents ought to serve the public interest
in the first place) becomes the “panel’s interest,” it reflects the vested
interests and influences of the panel. The introduction of a special “Ethics
and Public Interest Panel” would likely add another layer of complexity
and uncertainty to the patent race.
[8] Indeed, Richard Gold has recently written on many of the assumptions
upon which the patent system is built – namely, patents as ethically
neutral, negative rights which encourage research and dissemination of
knowledge.17 Gold, perhaps intentionally, challenges the Americentric,
capitalist view that patents are necessary to promote and encourage
research and economic growth.18 He systematically demonstrates that
patents are neither necessary to provide an incentive to innovate, nor are
they the optimal policy tool for stimulating and sustaining research and
development.19
[9] Gold also deals with the assumption that patents are ethically neutral.
He argues that the ethical neutrality of patents is “assumed by the
literature and jurisprudence.”20 He characterizes the assumption as
follows:
Were ethical review a necessary criterion for patentability
(as opposed to an ancillary regulatory concern), so this
16

Id. at 306.
See generally E. Richard Gold, et al., The Unexamined Assumptions of Intellectual
Property: Adopting an Evaluative Approach to Patenting Biotechnological Innovation
(European Univ. Inst. Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004 /45, 2004), available at
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/04_45.pdf (highlighting the assumptions upon
which intellectual property issues are structured).
18
Id. at 23.
19
See id. at 2-10.
20
Id. at 14.
17
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argument goes, it would jeopardize the ostensible neutrality
of the patent system which otherwise coordinates the
simultaneous and contradictory objectives of achieving
maximum levels of innovation and access to the products
of innovation.21
Gold acknowledges that this assumption is somewhat tenuous, especially
in considering that property is power and that control over significant
biotechnological resources is being delegated to the private sector on an ad
hoc, first-come, first-served basis; control is disbursed one patent at a
time.22 Gold sums up these assumptions neatly:
Together, they lead to a policy of relying on the patent
system to encourage most research. But as the patent
system provides a reward for commercial products and
processes and not for the acquisition of basic knowledge,
the combination of these assumptions leads to an overemphasis on applied, as opposed to basic, research.
Although such an approach may be economically
favourable in the short term, it threatens longer-term
sustainability and economic competitiveness.23
[10] Later in his work (after constructing a solid and uncontroversial
framework, like Vaver), Gold proposes what he labels a “compelling
alternative,” namely, the evaluation of intellectual property (patents in
particular) through the use of transdisciplinary probes.24 His proposal is
weakened by the ambitious goal of replacing one paradigm of how patents
are granted and construed with another (similar to Vaver’s suggestions for
reform). Gold’s transdisciplinary probes also assume that the involvement
of other fields of inquiry into the patenting process would somehow
alleviate administrative burden, and indeed, it assumes some level of
congruence and agreement among those “transdisciplines.” Ironically,
Gold’s transdisciplinary probes need their own assumptions examined.
21

Id.
Id. at 15.
23
Id. at 19.
24
Id. at 20-31.
22
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II. HISTORICAL VIEWS ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
[11] While the previous section provided a brief overview of patentable
subject matter as it stands today, the following section provides an
overview of how patentable subject matter has been cast historically. The
statutory basis for modern patent law originated in Italy under the
Venetian Statute of 1474.25 English patent law did not find a statutory
basis until the Statute of Monopolies in 1623. 26
[12] Many scholars have examined the early jurisprudence following the
enactment of the Statute of Monopolies to distil how earlier Courts had
viewed patentability and patentable subject matter. Justine Pila however,
provides a new twist on these views. She provides a historical account of
how inherently patentable subject matter was viewed by the Courts before
the Statute of Monopolies (which again, gave rise to the modern patent
system in so far as it is used throughout the Commonwealth).27 Pila notes
that:
[there] has been a tendency to treat the Statute of
Monopolies as having given rise to a new body of law,
rather than given legislative form to an existing
jurisprudence. This tendency—first recognised by E
Wyndham Hulme in 1896—continues to be particularly
problematic in countries (such as Australia and New
Zealand) in which the meaning of “invention” still derives
expressly from the Statute of Monopolies, and in other
common law countries that continue to rely on

25

See Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Juridical Origins of the International Patent System: Towards
a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization, 5 J. Hist. Int’l L. 403, 413
(2003). The statutory basis for modern patent law can be traced to Italy, this is not to say
that patent ‘systems’ themselves have strictly Italian roots). Mgbeoji, for instance, has
traced patents systems to the Andaman Islanders, the Kai, the Koryak and the Plains
Indians. Id. at 406.
26
Justine Pila, The Common Law Invention in Its Original Form 8-9 (Univ. of Melborne
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 18, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270909.
27
Id. at 2-9.
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jurisprudence said to originate with the Statute of
Monopolies to explicate their own patent legislation.28
[13] The Statute of Monopolies was merely the legislative response to an
existing body of jurisprudence and royal prerogative concerning the grant
of letters patent.29 It was not until 1601 that the Crown lost its exclusive
jurisdiction over letters patent, allowing the common law courts to weigh
in on the matter for the first time.30
[14] In Darcy v. Allin, the Court of the King’s Bench held that Her
Majesty’s 1598 grant of a monopoly over the manufacture, sale, and
import of playing cards was invalid, since it amounted to granting a
monopoly over an existing trade, as opposed to a new trade (or
invention).31 Likewise in the Clothworkers of Ipswich case,32 the Court
held that:
[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade
within the kingdom . . . or if a man hath made a new
discovery of any thing . . . [the King] may grant by charter
unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or trafique for
a certain time . . . but when that patent is expired, the King
cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is
become common, and others have been bound apprentices
in the same trade, there is no reason that such should be
forbidden to use it.33
[15] Pila therefore notes that the only subject matter which generally
qualified for patentability were entire trades or devices.34 The mere
addition to a trade or device, or anything derivative of such trades or
28

Id. at 1.
Id. at 7 n.64 (“The 1601 debate in Parliament focused on a bill entitled ‘An Act for the
Explanation of the Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patent’ which clarified the
common law limits of the Crown’s power to grant monopolies.”).
30
Id. at 7-8.
31
(1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.).
32
(1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.).
33
Id. at 148.
34
Pila, supra note 26, at 10.
29
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devices, would not qualify as patentable subject matter.35 Although Pila’s
observations are insightful from a historical perspective, the Statute of
Monopolies no longer forms the basis for the Patent Acts of Canada, nor
for the U.S., nor the U.K. (the latter being harmonized with the European
Patent Convention). So while Pila’s observations might be pertinent to
New Zealand or Australian patent law, they lie beyond the bounds of this
work. Furthermore, early jurisprudence often reflects the priorities and
interests of the Courts at those times; it does not necessarily tell us how a
statute is to be read or interpreted in today’s world. Patentable subject
matter may have been restricted to new inventions or new trades “as a
whole” because of the relative scarcity or unavailability of information as
to true novelty or rightful ownership. A pragmatic scheme was devised
which would only grant patents for such macro-categories.
[16] In other writings, however, Pila notes that much of the excluded
subject matter from American jurisprudence (namely, laws of nature,
natural phenomena and abstract ideas)36 are actually mirrored within the
Commonwealth’s exclusions to patentability as well.37 Such underlying
similarities suggest an international coherence in patent law existed well
before the standard-setting agenda of TRIPS. It is this “unholy” and
unpatentable trinity of excluded subject matter that form the bulk of the
American writings on patent-eligible subject matter.
III. THE UNHOLY AND UNPATENTABLE TRINITY – LAWS OF NATURE,
NATURAL PHENOMENA AND ABSTRACT IDEAS38
[17] Michael Meehan notes that despite the expansive wording of the U.S.
Patent Statute, it has nonetheless been “well established” in jurisprudence
that mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and

35

See id. at 11.
See Justine Pila, Inherent Patentability in Anglo-Australian Law: A History, 14 AUSTL.
INTELL. PROP. J. 109, 140-41, 163 (2003), available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0169/papers/inhpathistory.pdf
37
See generally id. at 109 (discussing the evolution of judicial constructions of inherent
patentability).
38
Throughout this work, I shall refer to laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract
ideas as either the “unholy trinity,” or the “unholy and unpatentable trinity.”
36
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abstract ideas cannot be patented.39 He notes that the U.S. Supreme Court
has consistently held that such discoveries “are not the kind of
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”40
[18] Meehan raises an interesting point, which he argues against
vigorously later in his paper, that perhaps,
One might argue that the limited monopoly provided by the
patent system should reward those who discover useful new
mathematical algorithms, unknown laws of nature, new
scientific facts, and novel abstract ideas. Perhaps one
should be given the reward (ex post) or incentive (ex ante)
of a patent monopoly in exchange for the effort involved.41
Meehan raises this argument in the context of examining the Federal
Circuit’s appellate decision in Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory
Corp. of America Holdings.42 That case involved the licensing of a
patented method of testing homocysteine levels in body fluids, while the
patent at issue specifically sought to protect the scientific connection
between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency.43 From 1992 to
1998, Metabolite sublicensed this patent to Laboratory Corp. (“LabCorp”)
in exchange for a royalty stream. After 1998, however, LabCorp began
using another test developed by Abbott Laboratories and discontinued
royalty payments to Metabolite.44 At the district court level, the trial jury
found that LabCorp breached its contract with Metabolite, and that the

39

Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature: Patentable Subject Matter and Laboratory
Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 312 (2006).
40
Id. at 312-13 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
41
Id. at 313.
42
370 F.3d 1354 (2004).
43
B vitamins facilitate the metabolism of homocysteine, an amino acid. The patent
licensed to Metabolite explains a two-step method for testing for homocysteine (an amino
acid); and then correlating the level with the B vitamin levels in the body. Duke Law,
Supreme Court Online,
http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/labvmet.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2008).
44
Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
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patent claim in question was valid.45 The jury awarded damages of
$3,652,724.61 to Metabolite for Labcorp’s breach of contract and
$1,019,365.01 for its indirect infringement.46 The district court granted a
permanent injunction, and doubled the infringement award because
Labcorp wilfully infringed the patent in question.47
[19] Meehan argues that the patent licensed to Metabolite should have
been declared invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court, since it was either a law
of nature, or merely the discovery of “the Handiwork of Nature.”48
Although Meehan’s demarcation here is not entirely clear, or sound, he
argues that the patentees merely patented a method of correlating two
events – a correlation which already existed, independent of, and
unimproved by, their “mere” discovery of it.49
[20] Unfortunately for Meehan, after he published his piece, the Supreme
Court, in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc., dismissed the writ of certiorari in Metabolite as being
improvidently granted (and hence, did not address the merits of the
case).50 Interestingly though, Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Stevens
and Justice Souter) offered a strong dissenting opinion as to why the Court
should not have dismissed the writ.51 Perhaps something of a vindication
to Meehan, the dissent takes the view that the claim in question was
indeed invalid, since it amounted to a monopoly on a scientific correlation
– nothing more than a law of nature, or at the very least, a natural
phenomenon.52 The dissent expressly adopted and reinforced the notion
that the unpatentability of the unholy trinity – laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas – is a “given”; that is, the dissent assumed
the soundness of excluding these from patent eligibility. Although Justice
Breyer admitted that these categories were and are often not easy to
45

Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 99-CV-870, 2001 WL
34778749, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2001).
46
Id.
47
Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1358.
48
Meehan, supra note 39, at 313. Only claim 13 was at issue. Id. at 315.
49
Id.
50
548 U.S. 124, 124 (2006).
51
Id. at 124 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52
Id. at 132, 135.
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define, his dissent clarified that this case was “not at the boundary …
claim 13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that
doctrine.”53 Meehan agrees with Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite;
both posit that patents relating to basic scientific relationships and
methods ought to be declared invalid because they are given for ineligible
subject matter, irrespective of how guised the claim drafting may be.54
[21] In its most basic formulation, the exclusion of laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patentability underscores the very
powerful argument that these are things which either exist independently
of humans (irrespective of how useful or difficult its discovery may have
been). This exclusion from patentability also emphasizes that these are
items to which one may not ascribe property rights; to do so would be
inappropriate, unenforceable, or impractical. Now, if we consider laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas to be the most fundamental,
raw, or ethereal subject matter in the natural world, then, conceptually, the
tools and methods employed by scientists in discovering them are one
layer above that.
IV. MONOPOLIZING THE TOOLS OF BASIC RESEARCH
[22] There are a growing number of scholars (primarily American) who
contend that the basic tools or elements of scientific research ought to
continue to be excluded from patentability. Eileen Kane is one of these
writers.55 Though she concedes that the “rationales for the exclusion of
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas cannot be described
with precision,”56 she also writes that “[t]he absence of extensive
justifications by the Court may speak for itself.”57 This thought is perhaps
as equivocal a statement as is permissible in scholarship, since the absence
of extensive justification may indicate that the Court is being arbitrary or
circumventive. It is precisely this reason – that there is little coherent
53

Id. at 135.
Id. at 135-38; Meehan, supra note 39, at 312-13.
55
Eileen Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 519 (2006).
56
Id. at 545 (citing ROBERT S. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, J. PATENT LAW AND POLICY
151 (3d ed. 2002)).
57
Id.
54
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rationale to exclude either these basic tools of research, or the unholy
trinity – which forms the basis for my view that exceptions to patentability
ought not to be as widely drawn as much of the jurisprudence and writings
in the Commonwealth and America suggest.
[23] Nonetheless, Kane agrees with the Court’s view in Gottschalk v.
Benson58 that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”59 For instance, she
argues that the genetic code, which defines the relationship between DNA
and protein, is a law of nature and anything that attempts to replace this
law of nature erodes the legitimacy of gene patents.60 Kane states that
advances in nanotechnology also present subject-matter-eligibility
problems on the level of an atomic or subatomic structure, since these are
either natural phenomena or governed by laws of nature.61
[24] In addressing precisely these two concerns, Jason Williams considers
the challenges that proteomics (a branch of biotechnology dealing with the
structure and function of proteins) poses to patent law.62 Williams’
approach is similar to Kane’s. He stresses that there ought to be an
available scientific commons in which the basic tools of scientific research
and advancement are available to the scientific community, without the
fear of infringement and litigation.63
[25] Williams traces the development and inclusion of biotechnological
advances into the realm of patentable subject matter, and acknowledges
that “[c]onventional patent theory completely supports a strong protection
regime for fields that need incentives for private research and
development.”64 He disputes that biotechnology as a whole and
58

409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
Id. at 67.
60
Kane, supra note 55, at 552.
61
Id. at 552-53.
62
J. Jason Williams, Protecting the Frontiers of Biotechnology Beyond the Genome: The
Limits of Patent Law in the Face of the Proteomics Revolution, 58 VAND. L. REV. 955,
958 (2005).
63
See id. at 958.
64
Id. at 985 (accepting this justification for the granting of patents without questioning it
further, while being careful to use the phrase “conventional patent theory”).
59
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proteomics in particular are unlike other areas of technology and therefore
they defy many comparisons.65 Although such claims can be made about
any new scientific (or other) paradigm – indeed, the same was said about
Internet “law” barely a decade ago.
[26] Although his demarcation needs to be developed a bit further (e.g.
that biotechnology is not technology, then but it is, then but it is not),
Williams postulates that, much like the Orphan Drug Act66 and the
(derelict) Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,67 a sui generis statutory
scheme for biotechnology would better enhance research, innovation, and
(presumably) the common good.68 Williams fails to consider how
advances in biotechnology could be separated, either by definition or in
practice, from other technological advances; he fails to provide a
definition of biotechnology at all. The expansiveness of the term becomes
apparent if we adopt the definition of biotechnology from the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity: “any technological
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives
thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.” 69
Indeed, there is no bright line here for Williams to draw.
[27] Yet in other writings, less radical means have been suggested as
ways to deal with biotechnological innovations. Burton Ong, for instance,
argues that organic innovations in particular ought to be protected by
process patents, rather than product patents.70 He argues that if one were
to accept a desert-based approach to patent entitlements, then patents
ought to never be granted for organic inventions (per se), since the only
contribution that the inventor can claim is the process through which the
inventor realized that organic matter.71 Hence, the process ought to be
65

Id. at 985-86.
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1998).
67
17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988).
68
Cf. Williams, supra note 62, at 992 (allowing the existing patent system to remain
intact while providing for the requisite elements of biological molecule patents).
69
Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
art. 2, opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818 (1992).
70
Burton T. Ong , Patenting the Biological Bounty of Nature: Re-Examining the Status
of Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 89 (2004).
71
See id. at 28.
66
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patentable, but not the actual organic product since that contribution only
extends to the means, not the ends, and this is the limit of his or her
“desert.”72 Although Ong’s position is inviting, it still confines the
processes, methods, and means of basic research to a patent monopoly.
[28] Nonetheless, the topic remains controversial as American scholarship
trends away from expanding patentable subject matter to the basic
elements or tools of research, on the grounds that they represent scientific
or intellectual “commons.” Peter Lee continues this tradition by arguing
that patent law
[S]pecifically prohibits the patenting of . . . natural laws,
natural phenomena, and abstract principles on a
‘fundamentality’ rationale; these assets enable wide
varieties of derivative applications and are better suited for
common ownership in the public domain where all persons
can freely draw upon them in their innovative endeavors.73
[29] He argues that if we accept this basis (which is the prevailing
exclusionary theory in the United States against the patentability of those
items), then elements of biotechnology like human embryonic stem cells,
which are patentable technologies when isolated and purified outside of
the human organism and equally as fundamental, may facilitate the
advancement of much of the biological sciences.74 Like Williams, the
crux of Lee’s article is that many advances in biotechnology that are
currently considered patentable ought not be, since those innovations form
the basic research tools in the biological sciences.75
[30] The argument against the expansion of patentable subject matter on
the grounds of fundamentality, as Lee puts it, will be examined in more
72

See id.
Peter Y. Lee, Abstract, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common
Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology
Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. AND TECH. 79 (2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=897629.
74
Id. at 88 (“Stem cell research promises to advance fundamental knowledge of human
developmental biology and cell regeneration.”).
75
See id. at 81.
73
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depth in Part VI. Yet, it may well be that advances in biotechnology are
viewed as the tools of scientific research since the field is new and
revolutionary. If we accept this line of argument, then any scientific
breakthrough that peels back another layer of “fundamentality” (which is
what science does) will reveal that the existing layer was not truly
fundamental after all and that awarding patents for that previously
fundamental layer is now acceptable, ad infinitum.
V. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO INVENTION
[31] Since the mid 1990s, TRIPS has become the principal tool of
international intellectual property standard setting. Article 27.1 of TRIPS
provides that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”76
TRIPS arguably creates a subject matter threshold, as well as a
patentability threshold—in that there must first be an “invention,” which
in turn, will only receive patent protection once it satisfies the usual
hallmarks of patentability (namely, novelty, inventiveness and industrial
applicability).77
[32] The subtlety of this drafting has been addressed by writers such as
George Wei78 and Luigi Palombi.79 Palombi’s writing on gene patents
discusses the compatibility of TRIPS and the European Biotechnology
Directive.80 Palombi points out that the TRIPS “invention” requirement is
supported by many cases such as Genentech Inc.’s Patent,81 but
undermined by other holdings, demonstrated by Lord Hoffman’s remarks
in Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc.82 Lord Hoffman, dismissed the initial
question of whether something is an “invention” as an invariably
76

TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.
Luigi Palombi, Patentable Subject Matter, TRIPS and the European Biotechnology
Directive: Australia and Patenting Human Genes, 26 U.N.S.W.L.J. 782, 782 (2003)
(Austl.).
78
George Wei, Inventions, Genes and Napoleonic Victories, 9 SING. ACAD. L.J. 1 (1997).
79
Palombi, supra note 77.
80
Id., at 782-84.
81
Genentech Inc.’s Patent, supra note 1.
82
Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 114 R.P.C. 1, 41-42 (1997) (U.K.).
77
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“academic” consideration.83 He found that when the Court determines
patentability, the first inquiry should not be what is an “invention”; rather,
“[j]udges would . . . be well advised to put on one side their intuitive sense
of what constituted an invention until they have considered the questions
of novelty, inventiveness and so forth.”84 Wei rightly argues that this
commonsense approach is undoubtedly the most practical way for the
Courts to ordinarily proceed, however, there can be no doubt that there is a
residue of cases where the issue of defining an “invention” is still very
much alive, and not to be cursorily labelled as “academic.”85 Indeed,
Palombi’s contention is that the European Biotechnology Directive
actually violates TRIPS and its subtle drafting (as I have characterized
it).86 Article 1.1 of the Directive states that: “Member States shall protect
biotechnological inventions under national patent law. They shall, if
necessary, adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions
of this Directive.”87
[33] Palombi notes that TRIPS requires all member states to consider
inventions for patentability equally and consistently across “all fields of
technology.”88 The Directive therefore presumes that biotechnological
inventions are indeed inventions, and ignores the subject matter threshold
step (or test) mandated by TRIPS and is “a direct violation of [article] 27.1
of TRIPS.”89 Admittedly, the Directive does appear to be a violation of
TRIPS on its face. Palombi fails to mention, however, that the very next
subsection of the Directive (Article 1.2) provides that “[t]his Directive
shall be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States
pursuant to international agreements, and in particular the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity.”90 Therefore, the
Directive—far from being a violation of TRIPS—now appears toothless in
light of the fact that TRIPS is seemingly intended to take priority over it.
83

Id. at 42.
Id.
85
See Wei, supra note 78, at 15.
86
Palombi, supra note 77, at 783; see also Council Directive 98/44, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L
213) 13 (EC).
87
Council Directive 98/44, supra note 86.
88
Palombi, supra note 77, at 790.
89
See Id. (alteration in original).
90
Council Directive 98/44, supra note 86.
84
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If a subject matter threshold step (or test) is required before we consider
the usual hallmarks of patentability, then we cannot presume that
biotechnological innovations are inventions ab initio.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PATENTS ON INTANGIBLES
[34] Implicitly or explicitly, a considerable portion of Parts III, IV and V,
is devoted to the problems that biotechnology, in particular, present for
many of the fundamental patent doctrines, and traditional exclusions from
patentability. The following sections break from this tradition, and
examine the subject matter eligibility of intangibles—business methods,
software, signals and even sporting techniques. Next, in Part VII, I survey
some of writings on the role that ethics play—or ought not to play—in
demarcating patent-eligible subject matter. I will also examine the
emerging literature on human-animal chimeras which are inexorably tied
to such concerns.
[35] By commenting on patents for business methods (i.e., patents
covering methods for performing business operations), Nari Lee provides
a comparative insight into these patents’ treatment across Japan, the U.S.,
and Europe.91 Lee traces how the courts and patent offices in those
countries or regions have redefined the meaning of technology, and
inventions thereof, from the context of physical instantiation (i.e., physical
transformation) to the level of conceptual instantiation (i.e., useful
information) in order to bring business methods within the realm of
patentable subject matter.92

91

Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of
Proprietarian Norms - The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 327-28
(2005).
92
Patents are granted based on two substantive tests. A “categorical test on patentable
subject matter” and a “series of tests to ensure the validity of a specific patent” including
the usual hallmarks of patentability “novelty, inventiveness/non-obviousness, and
utility/industrial applicability.” Id. at 331.
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[36] Lee argues that this change in institutional thinking (whether through
the courts or the patent offices) reflects a change in philosophy from
utilitarian instrumentalism to proprietarianism:93
In this aspect, reconfiguration reflects a change in
the normative justification of patent institution. It is
difficult to justify business method patenting under the
traditional utilitarian instrumentalism . . . . The
reconfiguration of patentable subject matter to protect the
values created by business methods with patent property
rules, instead of creating a new exclusionary right, could be
characterized as proprietarian.94
I disagree with this view. Indeed, it is perhaps convenient that Lee ties
patentability solely to utilitarian instrumentalism, and ignores that labourdesert theory95 can, just as readily, justify patents (in general), and
business method patents (in particular).96 There is no necessary
movement towards proprietarianism here.
[37] With respect to software, it is common knowledge that such subject
matter is now considered patent eligible; although it must usually produce
some “useful, concrete and tangible result,”97 possess a technical
character,98 or be integrated with other statutory matter (computer
93

Peter Drahos describes “proprietarianism” as “a creed and an attitude which inclines its
holders towards a property fundamentalism.” PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 201 (1996). See Lee, supra note 91, at 351-55.
94
Lee, supra note 91, at 358-59.
95
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
96
I am not saying that labour-desert theory is a necessarily sound or wholly satisfactory
theory either. Rather, I am arguing that Lee simply failed to consider it in his quest to find
proprietarianism. Lee’s work also ignores the role that policy plays in legislative attitudes
and judicial decision-marking. It may well be that business methods are now considered a
protected form of knowledge—whereas traditional knowledge is not—chiefly because of
the extensive lobbying and commercial interests at play.
97
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); AT&T v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d
1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
98
Although Art. 52(2) of the European Patent Convention enumerates “programs for
computers” as outside the definition of invention, Art. 52(3) limits that exclusion by
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implement inventions).99 Jinseok Park, in examining the software
patenting practices across United States, European, and Japanese Patent
Offices, notes that USPTO, EPO, and JPO have all agreed that to “merely
automate a known human transaction process using well-known
automation techniques [i.e., a computer-implemented business process] is

stating that it applies “only to the extent to which a European patent application or
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.” European Patent
Office, European Patent Convention, pt. II, ch. I (July 2007),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/E4F8409B2A99862FC125736B0
0374CEC/$File/EPC_13th_edition.pdf. Hence, computer software is patentable in
Europe insofar as it produces a technical character. Id. pt. III, ch. II, R. 42. But the
technical character requirement is not directed to software per se; rather, it protects
certain concrete or “‘real world’ activities.” Case of Vicom, T-208/84 Technical Board
of Appeal 15 July 1986, O.J. EPO 1987/014, available at http://legal.european-patentoffice.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm.
99
This appears to be the current situation in Canada. Following the decision in
Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, [1981] 1 F.C. 845 (the only court
decision in Canada to expressly deal with the patentability of software), the Manual of
Patent Office Practice identified the subject matter which is eligible for patenting as
follows:
The claimed subject matter must fall in one of the recognized
categories of art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter . . . .
. . . [C]omputer related subject matter is not excluded from
patentability if the traditional criteria for patentability are satisfied.
Software that has been integrated with statutory subject matter may be
patentable.
....
A claim to a method consisting only of making certain
calculations according to certain formulae is, even if it results in useful
information, excluded from patentability under subsection 27(8) of the
Patent Act. Such a method does not include an act or series of acts
performed by some physical agent upon some physical object and
producing in such object some change either of character or of
condition. Furthermore, the method does not produce an essentially
economic result relating to trade, industry or commerce . . . .
CANADIAN PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE 163 (1998 ed., Feb. 2005).
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not patentable.”100 The utility of this statement is entirely lost when one
considers that any human transaction which is already known and uses
well-known techniques would fail to meet the novelty requirements
required for patentability irrespective of any discussion as to whether the
subject matter itself is patentable. So, aside from the fact that software
generally qualifies as patent-eligible subject matter across much of the
world, there is little other multinational conformity to be found.
[38] On the larger issue of intangible inventions and their subject matter
eligibility, Richard Gruner examines the current boundaries of the patent
system to determine when, if, or how they should be redrawn so as to
“ensure that patent rights serve the same valuable functions concerning
intangible innovations” as they have served for their earlier physical or
mechanical counterparts.101 Gruner identifies “algorithms, scientific
discoveries, naturally occurring items, mental steps, and printed matter” as
subject matter traditionally beyond such boundaries.102 While the first
three are simply restatements of the unholy trinity, I will briefly discuss
the printed matter exclusion as it has not received any treatment in the
literature up to this point.
[39] Informational text or images recorded on printed matter have
generally been held unpatentable by U.S. courts.103 These courts held the
view that merely reducing an idea, abstraction, method, or process to

100

Jinseok Park, Has Patentable Subject Matter Been Expanded?-A Comparative Study
on Software Patent Practices in the European Patent Office, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office, 13 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 336, 37172 (2005) (emphasis added); see REPORT ON COMPARATIVE STUDY CARRIED OUT UNDER
TRILATERAL PROJECT B3B, available at
http://www.trilateral.net/projects/other_project/business_method/.
101
Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 355 (2002).
102
See id. at 384.
103
In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (“It is well established in patent law that
invention cannot rest alone in novel printing arrangement, although it may reside in some
physical structures of printed matter.”); see also Note, The Patentability of Printed
Matter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 476 (1950) (“The origin of
the printed-matter doctrine is found in the longstanding rule that abstractions, mental
theories or business methods are not patentable subject matter.”).
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writing did not amount to an invention.104 Even before the court in State
Street Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. put the
“ill-conceived” business method exemption aside, 105 there was little
discussion in the jurisprudence to explain why the printed matter doctrine
existed.106 Nonetheless, an important exception to this doctrine exists
104

Boggs v. Robertson, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 214 (D.C. June 23, 1931) (“The
authorities are uniform in holding printed matter per se to be unpatentable, i.e., where an
idea is simply an abstraction the mere reduction of it to writing does not amount to
invention.”).
105
149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
106
For instance, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir.
1908), the Court quotes Fowler v. City of New York, 121 F. 747, 478. (2d Cir. 1903), in
reaching its decision (“No mere abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can be the subject
of a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it effect.”). Although Fowler did
not deal with printed matter, the Hotel Security holding derived the principle that
abstractions rendered to paper cannot be patentable. Hotel Security, 160 F. at 469. Many
later cases cite to Hotel Security directly. See., e.g., In re Dixon, 44 F.2d 881, 881
(C.C.P.A. 1930); Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926); Moore v. United
States, 50 Ct. Cl. 120, 126 (1915); Berardini v. Tocci, 200 F. 1021,1022 (2d Cir. 1912).
Other cases cite cases which, in turn, cite the Hotel Security decision. See, e.g., Boggs,
13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 216; In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Flint v. G.
R. Leonard & Co., 27 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1928). Pamela Samuelson has offered two
rationales:
One reason for the “printed matter” rule may be a perception that
although printing itself is a manufacturing process and part of the
technological arts, the printed matter itself–and its contents, in
particular–are not “in the technological arts,” even when about the
technological arts. A book describing how to organize one’s work force
in a rubber curing plant most effectively might be the product of a
manufacturing process (i.e., the book) and it might be about a
manufacturing process, but the content of the work would still not be
the kind of manufacture or process traditionally considered to be
patentable.
Underlying the “printed matter” rule may be a perception that
printed matter is among the set of things that are “writings” protectible
by copyright law, not inventions in the “useful arts,” and that copyright
law strikes the appropriate balance between protection of expression
and nonprotection of ideas for written texts. This balance would be
disrupted if patents were available based on the content of the “printed
matter.” When “printed matter” has been patented, it has generally been
in situations in which it has been integrated into some machine or
physical structure which then supports the patent.
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where the printed matter is somehow functionally connected to a physical
structure or otherwise produces a functionally useful result.107

Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1037
n.36 (1990).
107
The Court in Boggs summarized the law well:
[T]he claims were properly refused in the Patent Office on the ground
that the subject-matter does not come within the purview of section
4886, Revised Statutes (35 U.S.C.A. 31).
....
The transfer ticket case, Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Poue, 210
F. 443, involved in general the street-car transfer ticket in general use
today with a coupon to be either torn off or left on to indicate a.m. or
p.m. use of the ticket. The paper on which the printed matter appeared
was used physically in addition to serving as a mere support for the
printed matter. The coupon was also arranged to be punched to indicate
dates and time of the day.
The scrip book case, Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip
Book Co., 187 F. 984, involved a book having a series of coupons to be
detached from a strip for use in payment of transportation calculated in
terms of money instead of mileage coupons.
The Benjamin Menu Card Co. v. Rand, McNally Co., 210 F.
285, involved a menu card consisting of a combined waiter's check, a
cook's check, and a guest's check. . . .
The advertising card case, Mitchell v. International Tailoring
Co., 170 F. 91, involved an advertising card consisting of two parts so
designed that one of the parts could be thrown away after having served
its purpose while the other part was designed to be kept. The card was
physically used in addition to its use as a support for the printed matter.
In each of these cases the thing involved was a physical object
adapted to be handled and used in a certain manner due to the physical
construction thereof; in each case the complete object was formed of a
definite form and substance of a physical body supplemented by indicia
disposed thereof in a particular manner to provide an actual physical
cooperation between the body and indicia.
In the present case, no article comprising a definite physical
body and structurally-related indicia is shown; but merely a system of
lines without reference to any tangible article.
. . . I am of opinion that in all cases where the printed matter,
irrespective of the material upon which it is printed, is the sole feature
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[40] Gruner notes that while printed matter and the unholy trinity
continue to receive much judicial “hostility,” the acceptance of algorithms
as patentable subject matter should suggest a general framework for
recognizing and dealing with patentable subject matter in otherwise
intangible inventions.108 According to Gruner, the Arrhythmia analysis:
“whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm
itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm
that is not applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps”109 is
the proper analysis to apply when determining whether intangible
inventions contain patentable subject matter or if the invention or method

of alleged novelty it does not come within the purview of the statute, as
it is merely an abstract idea. But where the paper or physical body upon
which the matter is printed is designed to be used with the printed
matter, as by tearing apart or punching, it becomes more than an
abstract idea but an actual physical article of manufacture within the
terms of [the Patent Statute], and as such is patentable if it be a new and
useful inventive concept.
The decisions make this distinction – that where no
dependence exists between the printed matter and the object on which
arranged such matter is merely an idea reduced to writing and is not a
manufacture.
Boggs, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 215 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in
original) (citing Act of May 23 ,1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 161 (2000))).
108
Gruner, supra note 101, at 396-97, 467.
109
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
Determination of statutory subject matter has been conveniently
conducted in two stages, following a protocol initiated by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197
U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978); modified after the Court’s Flook
decision by In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. 397 (C.C.P.A.
1980); and again after the Court’s Diehr decision by In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Id.
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lacks the requisite physical significance or relevance.110 Inevitably, many
of these concerns can be addressed by proper claim drafting.111
[41] Gruner’s analysis concludes with what he believes to be a new
framework for encouraging innovation in intangible inventions.112 He
argues that inventions are the products of “agency processes in which an
inventor acts as the agent for a group of principals comprised of the
potential users of the inventor’s discoveries.”113 Gruner misses the mark
here. There are too many neglected nuances in this assertion. Granted, he
provides a useful insight into the shift from subject matter ineligibility to
eligibility for intangible inventions; but his suggestion that inventors are
agents for potential users goes too far.114 This concept is foreign to patent
law. Inventors invent. An “invention” is the right to exclude others. It is
not a right to produce or create that invention. If inventors were seen as
“mere” agents acting for the benefit of the “potential users,” this would
imply that somewhere within the concept of inventorship lay a positive
duty to produce or create that invention.
[42] In a similar vein, one would imagine that propagated signal claims –
transient manufactured115 phenomena like electrical, optical or acoustical
signals – ought to have presented similar problems with respect to their
ephemerality and intangibility. Authors, such as Kunin, Lytle,116 and
Han,117 however, argue that as far back as 1854 the U.S. Supreme Court
110

See Gruner, supra note 101, at 396 (“[A]n analytic method will be patentable subject
matter if the method is used to evaluate data or information with physical significance or
relevance, giving the result further physical significance and practical utility.”).
111
See generally WIPO Second International Conference on Electronic Commerce and
Intellectual Property, Sept. 19-21, 2001, Business Method Patents and Beyond: Why
E=mc2 Is Inherently Patentable (at least in the U.S. and Australia),
WIPO/EC/CONF/01/SPK/3C, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ecommerce/en/wipo_ec_conf_01/wipo_ec_conf_01_sp
k_3c.pdf (discussing the inherent patentability of abstract concepts).
112
Gruner, supra note 101, at 467-69.
113
Id. at 467.
114
See id.
115
As opposed to naturally occurring signals, these are propagated by “man.”
116
Stephen G. Kunin & Bradley D. Lytle, Patent Eligibility of Signal Claims, 87 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 991, 994 (2005).
117
Sam S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of "Intangible" Yet "Physical" Subject
Matter, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 25 (2002). In reviewing the jurisprudence
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upheld a patent on Samuel Morse’s telegraphy patents for his invention of
“a new and useful improvement in the mode of communicating
information by signals, by the application of electro-magnetism,” holding
only the eighth claim (the exclusive use of electro-magnetism)
unpatentable because it was overly broad.118
[43] More recently in Ex parte Rice, the USPTO’s Board of Patent
Appeal and Interferences reversed a patent examiner’s rejection of a signal
claim as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, holding instead
that electromagnetic signals although “transitory and ephemeral in nature”
are nonetheless statutory subject matter. 119 It might be a trite observation,
but as the matter was decided by the Board of Patent Appeal and
Interferences, it serves no precedential value. Despite this trend towards
patentability for signals per se, in In re Nuijten, a majority of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that transitory, propagating signals
fell outside the concept of an “invention” as being neither a process,
machine, manufacture, nor composition of matter. 120
[44] Kunin and Lytle have traced the acceptance of such claims in Canada
and Japan. They argue that while the situation with respect to signal
claims is unclear under the European Patent Convention, there is still an
increasing trend towards the acceptance of such claims.121 Yet, the
Canadian Intellectual Property Office has recently issued a practice notice
stating that electromagnetic and acoustic signals per se do not constitute
statutory subject matter within the definition of invention under section 2

with respect to algorithm patents, Han identifies that certain subject matter are excluded
from patentability by virtue of the fact that they form the basic tools of scientific research
and work. He does not expressly address, however, that patents on signals per se may
well be caught by this doctrine as well. See Id. ¶¶ 77-85.
118
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62, 84 (1853).
119
Ex parte Rice, No. 2002-1554 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 13, 2003), available at
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd021554.
120
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Justice Linn, dissenting in part,
argued that “manufacture” ought to be given an expansive reading; and new, useful and
non-obvious “man-made” signals were within its breadth as being directed towards
statutory subject matter. Id. at 1358.
121
Kunin & Lytle, supra note 116, at 1000.
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of the Canadian Patent Act.122 Neither Canadian jurisprudence, nor the
Canadian Patent Act, provides any basis to support the Canadian
Intellectual Property Office’s restriction (but there does appear to be an
implicit acceptance of it in the U.S. decision in In re Nuijten).123
[45] Kunin and Lytle explain that signal claims are potentially more
useful to patent holders than actual product claims since the patent holder
could “sue anyone who makes, uses, offers, or sells the invention.”124
Although this would also leave “intermediaries” like Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) and telecommunications companies vulnerable to
litigation since they would be making, using, and perhaps even
inadvertently selling or offering to sell, such patented signals in their
transmissions.125 Kunin and Lytle label such intermediaries as “innocent
infringers” and postulate that the courts may deal with the situation in the
same way that they have dealt with so-called “innocent infringers” in the
context of online copyright infringement.126
Patent infringement,
however, is a strict liability offence, and there is no concept of an
“innocent infringer” in patent law.127
[46] Furthermore, to analogize and propose a solution from copyright law
is tenuous at best. Consider that both copyright law and trademark law in
the U.S. have evolved to protect parodies (though, there is no such defence
in patent law). So, by Kunin and Lytle’s line of argument, if I were to
parody an invention by making an inane or obscure use of it, then I can
perhaps avoid liability in patent law since this defence has been accepted
in both copyright and trademark law in the U.S.
[47] Moving from tenuous to imaginative, Derek Bambauer provides
some focus to an ill-forgotten area of patentable subject matter, the
122

Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Office Practice Regarding Signals (Aug. 14,
2007), http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/notice_aug14_07-e.html.
123
See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357 (determining whether a signal of electric potential
or electromagnetic fields constitutes a composition of matter under patentable subject
matter); id.
124
Kunin & Lytle, supra note 116, at 999.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1002.
127
Id.
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patenting of actual sporting techniques and rules (so called “sports
patents”).128 His work actually builds on a brief commentary in the
Colorado Law Review, in which Jeffery Smith argues that sports moves
should not be considered patentable, on policy grounds,129 and on a non
peer-reviewed publication by Robert Kunstadt who argues that the
sporting industry is “open for savvy athletes and their agents to protect
their innovations through patent law.”130
[48] Bambauer traces how this area is now considered patentable, despite
the considerable doubt as to its viability in the past, and finds
philosophical support for sports patents under the labour-desert theory
(though he admits that sports patents fail the “utilitarian test”).131
Bambauer proposes that many of the concerns regarding the
monopolization of sporting techniques can be overcome by effective
licensing, or patent pooling, and intra-league cross-licensing
requirements.132 Capitalism is, of course, the answer. An answer which
holds true only if the patent owner is economically motivated; one could
just as easily patent techniques to prevent everyone from using them. For
instance, it appears as though I could patent sporting techniques in the
U.S. and, perhaps out of sheer Canadian patriotism, inter alia, prevent U.S.
Olympic athletes from using them in their training or qualifying rounds.
VII. ETHICS AND SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
[49] The role that ethics ought to play (if any) in determinations of subject
matter eligibility is fiercely contested in the literature, especially in light of
the recent attempt by Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin to patent a human
animal chimera (hereafter the “Newman-Rifkin patent application”) in the
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USPTO133 and the European Patent Convention’s prohibition against
patenting inventions “the exploitation of which would be contrary to
‘ordre public’ or morality.”134
[50] Valerie Phillips135 discusses how the Newman-Rifkin patent
application was crafted to cover humans per se,136 but claimed only
chimeras containing less than 50% of human genetic material.137 Phillips
traces the origins and development of the “moral utility” doctrine in U.S.
patent law. The American origin of the doctrine can be traced to the
Honorable Justice Story in Lowell v. Lewis, wherein the Honorable Justice
stated that “[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society.”138 Phillips postulates that the doctrine, though infrequently
invoked for nearly two centuries, may have a greater significance to
133
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Proposed Exclusion in the Patents Act 1953, 33 VUWLR 379, 379 (2002) (Austl.)
(discussing whether human beings ought to be patentable).
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assume in modern jurisprudence as it relates to biotechnological
advances.139 Unlike writers like Guerra and Chambers (discussed below),
Phillips believes that moral inquiries ought to play a role in subject matter
eligibility.140
[51] Although the Newman-Rifkin patent application was abandoned in
March of 2005, the patent application was first issued a Final Rejection by
the USPTO in August of 2004, on the grounds that the application would
either be, inter alia: 1) Inconsistent with the constitutional right to privacy
– since holders of the patent would be entitled to prevent others from
making or working the claimed invention, hence denying the actual person
with the right to decide when, or if, to procreate; or 2) Tantamount to
slavery (prohibited under the 13th Amendment), since patents preclude
others from “using” the invention, and employment can be construed as a
“use” – which “would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.141
[52] It is apparent that the USPTO took the view that even chimeras with
less than 50% of their genetic materials originating from humans were
nonetheless still human “enough” to justify the rejection. Even if we
sidestep the imprecise equivocation that 1% - 49% of raw human genetic
material is “enough” to consider something “human,” hence, worthy of
protection under the U.S. Constitution,142 there is still the objection that
none of the principal reasons cited by the USPTO are reasons against
patentable subject matter eligibility per se, rather they are objections with
respect to enforceability.
[53] Indeed, Richard Guerra believes that employing the patent system to
solve, in whole or in part, the ethical dilemmas posed in demarcating
between reproductive cloning and therapeutic cloning, or between the
139
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stages at which we consider life to be “human,” is a questionable practice
at best.143 Guerra believes patent law should be considered “an amoral
vehicle for commercialization, or as an instrument of wide-ranging moral
regulation.”144 Guerra derives support for his view from the first Patent
Act. He notes:
[D]elineating proper subject matter was, and continues to
be confined to meeting the novelty, non-obvious, utility,
and enablement requirements, and nowhere within the first
or current patent statute is there a requirement to conduct a
moral consideration of what is contrary to public policy.145
[54] Undoubtedly, Guerra is right with respect to the strict, literal wording
of the Act. Guerra also cites, but fails, to make the connection with the
Lowell v. Lewis decision that suggests courts may have read the moral
utility doctrine into the Patent Act precisely because Congress intends the
Act to be interpreted with this gloss. 146
VIII. POLICY AND SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
[55] I have separated the role that policy plays from subject matter
eligibility, not because policy and ethics are necessarily or always two
different enterprises, but because the writings in this area are simply less
concerned with ethics.
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[56] Consider the work of Jasemine Chambers, who writes from a
decidedly Americentric view of patent policy and the patent eligibility of
biotechnological inventions across the U.S., Europe, and Japan and argues
that “[w]orldwide, U.S. patent law provides the broadest protection of
biotechnological inventions, and significantly, the United States leads the
world in this area in terms of advancement and research efforts.”147 It is
not only because of patent protection that that the U.S. leads the way in
biotechnological research, as there are a myriad of other connected factors.
Patent eligibility may well be the least important of those; Chambers
neither explores nor acknowledges this position. Building on Bambauer’s
earlier work,148 the U.S. should also be a leader in most commercially
viable sports since it has the broadest protection for sporting techniques.
Although the relative lack of success for the U.S. in sports such as
soccer,149 cricket, hockey, and rugby suggests otherwise. If Chambers’s
thesis is taken to its logical, and not so distant conclusion, the U.S. should
be the leader in every biotechnological field since it offers the broadest
patent protection.
[57] Indeed, Chambers employs every single assumption identified by
Gold150 and endeavours to show that lack of patent protection for
biotechnological innovation would decrease research funding, decrease the
quality of medical services, and ultimately would stifle economic
growth.151 She notes that the European Patent Convention’s prohibition
on inventions that contravene ordre public or morality should not be
fostered, encouraged, or cultivated in U.S. Patent Law.152 Accordingly,
public policy and public involvement should be left out of the patent
eligibility question. She is particularly wary of invoking the moral utility
doctrine to deny patent eligibility on human animal chimeras.153 To
Chambers, “good” patent policy would: (a) look something like U.S.
patent policy (indeed, she devotes an entire section to the “discrepancies”
147
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of European and Japanese patent law); and (b) be completely devoid of
public policy concerns.154
[58] With the United States leading the way with TRIPS and its agenda of
intellectual property standard setting, scholarship like Chambers’s ought
make us all wary of the import of such international agreements. Indeed,
she asserts that “[t]he scope of patent eligible subject matter typically
expands as a nation realizes increasing economic growth and
industrialization,”155 without considering the role that TRIPS plays in
coercing that ever-expanding scope.156 Additionally, through negative
implication, Chambers suggests that countries that do not expand their
patent eligible subject matter may become, or already are, stumped in their
level of economic growth.157
[59] Whereas Chambers might see the U.S. as the gatekeeper for world
patent policy and subject matter eligibility—and to some extent, she may
be correct—David Olson believes U.S. Courts assume a lesser
gatekeeping role in determining subject matter eligibility.158 Building on
the concerns addressed in Meehan’s aforementioned work,159 Olson
specifically examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Metabolite. In
Olson’s view, the June 2006 dismissal of the writ of certiorari, represents
the Supreme Court and federal courts’ trend towards a more limited
“gatekeeping role” in establishing the scope and boundaries of patentable
subject matter.160
[60] Tracing the “rise and fall” of the need for physical transformation,
and the former exclusions of mental steps and business methods from
patent eligible subject matter, Olson views the Supreme Court’s dismissal
as exemplifying a recent tradition of abandonment of its role as a
154
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gatekeeper. Needless to say, he is keen on seeing the gatekeeper role
revived through a new administrative agency.
While Congress could take on the role of determining
efficient subject matter itself, it is probably not the body
best suited to the task. Congress probably does not have the
time or the ability to focus extended attention necessary to
come up with the best determinations of subject matter
patentability. In addition, Congress suffers from the wellknown problems of industry capture and susceptibility to
lobbying.
A better choice probably would be for Congress to
delegate the gatekeeper role to an administrative agency.
An administrative agency, such as the PTO, could devote
the time and resources necessary for thorough analysis. An
agency could hire and/or consult with economists, industry
members, academics, etc., so as to have a much greater
factual and analytical framework available to it in making
its determination than a court would typically have
available to it from the submissions of the parties to a
dispute.161
[61] Olson’s posture begs the question: How does more complexity
reduce complexity? Under this agency model, would the Courts lack
interpretative or appellate powers with respect to patent eligible subject
matter? Furthermore, hiring economists, industry members and academics
does not solve the problem that Congress faces with respect to lobbying.
It is well-known that economists, industry members, academics—
everyone—comes to the table with their own research agendas, views,
biases, funding, and so forth.162 Olson’s model also assumes that some
affirmative “truth” or consensus could be achieved. Relying on an agency
that would likely make decisions based on a majority basis, with
innumerable concessions along the way, is no different than the way the
161
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Courts, the USPTO, or the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
operate today. Olson’s proposal merely compounds the problem.
[62] Leaving Olson’s problematic introduction of a specialized agency
aside, there is still his very real concern that the Courts have indeed
abandoned their implicit role as gatekeepers of patent eligible subject
matter. Samuel Oddi has a rather singular answer.163 Oddi argues that
patent eligibility issues, in particular, ought to follow general
jurisprudential patterns, especially given the broad, permissive language of
patent statutes.164 In answer to Olson, he finds that
There appears to be a regenerative, self-correcting
mechanism at work over time with respect to opinions
restricting the scope of patent eligibility. Examples include
. . . Benson/Flook [which is corrected] by
Chakrabarty/Diehr/State Street. These “regenerations”
appear to represent repeated reversion to the policy driven
decision making process of the formative period.165
[63] In truth, the Courts are far from abandoning their roles as gatekeeper,
even Olson admits that this is a relatively recent state of affairs; the Courts
may simply be unconsciously caught in one of their regenerative cycles,
which could eventually be self-corrected.166
CONCLUSION
[64] Despite the divergence of jurisprudence and geographies of writers
in this area, a common thread among them appears to be an implicit
acceptance that despite how new, non-obvious, and useful a discovery or
163
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development may be, there ought to be some “things” that fail the
threshold of invention. “Invention” is a flexible concept, designed to
accommodate unforeseen advances in the practical application of human
knowledge. New advances in human understanding ought to expand
acceptance of what constitutes an invention, not diminish it.
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